Master and slave morality چودھری اور کمی

  • Nietzsche began his career as a philologist (student of ancient text and languages) and developed an overriding interest in the Ancient Greeks, who he thought represented the peak of Western civilization before the onset of ‘slave’ or ‘herd’ morality which culminated in Christian, Utilitarian and Kantian systems of ethics (among others). Like Callicles, Nietzsche argued that morality was something developed by ‘weak’ people in order to defend themselves from the ‘strong’.

    At this point, we might recall the elitism of Aristotle’s ethics, where moral excellence is only available to the nobility. However, Nietzsche has something rather different in mind. One of the main themes in Nietzsche’s work is that ancient Roman society was grounded in master morality, and that this morality disappeared as the slave morality of Christianity spread through ancient Rome. Nietzsche was concerned with the state of European culture during his lifetime and therefore focused much of his analysis on the history of master and slave morality within Europe (partly through the rise of ‘slave’ religion like Christianity.

    The superior person looks with profound suspicion on values such as compassion, pity, and selflessness, as well as on the ideal of equality of all persons. Superior people, in expressing the will to power, embody completely natural human functioning; they live the most completely actualized human lives, and as such, are happy, energetic, and optimistic about the human condition.

    Slave morality, by contrast, is pessimistic and fearful. Slaves are victims (the “abused, oppressed, suffering, unemancipated, the weary and those uncertain of themselves”; but according to Nietzsche, most slaves choose to be victims. Slave morality is timid, and favours a limited existence; it “makes the best of a bad situation.” It promotes the virtues that “serve to ease existence for those who suffer: here pity, the complaisant and obliging hand, the warm heart, patience, industry, humility, and friendliness are honored — for here these are the most useful qualities and almost the only means for enduring the pressure of existence. Slave morality is essentially a morality of utility,” i.e., a morality that values the mediocre group over the superior individual.

    In slave morality, “good” means “tending to ease suffering” and “evil” means “tending to inspire fear.” (In master morality, by contrast, it’s good to inspire fear.) Nietzsche believes that slave morality is expressed in the standard moral systems (particularly Christianity and utilitarianism). That is, Christianity and utilitarianism both exemplify the same ideology: the ideology of the majority, the herd, the cowardly, the conventional, the less-than-fully-human. Inferior people, who outnumber the superior ones, use ideologies (“slave moralities”) like Christianity, utilitarianism, and Marxism, to try to deny the will to power. They promulgate silly ideas like equality, and urge “virtues” like humility and pity. But they are trying to live a lie; they are trying to deny obvious facts of nature, and trying to make a virtue of their weakness and cowardice. In so doing, they develop artificial boundaries that constrain the strong from reaching their full potential.

    Nietzsche thinks slave moralities have pretty much taken over as the official moralities of the Western world; unlike most philosophers, he thinks the triumph of ideals like equality and democracy in modern times is a great tragedy for humanity. Equality and democracy are for Nietzsche the worst, not the best, values; they are the exact opposite of what humans in their hearts actually value, the opposite of what it is natural to value. Inferior people naturally see the superiority of their “natural” masters; hence by nature, they fear them and feel uncomfortable with them. When slave morality takes hold, the inferior ones are suddenly given “moral” license to brainwash and persecute those who try to express the will to power. Thus when the ideal of equality rules, the best specimens of humanity are at risk. Nietzsche would like to revert to an ancient “classical” time when the “natural aristocrats” (those who expressed the will to power) actually ruled.

    For Nietzsche, any feelings of guilt are simply the ‘bad conscience’ of unhealthy Christian morality, which ‘turns a blind eye’ to our natural inclinations. He is not critical of all morality, however: he appeals to the ‘higher morality’ that informs the actions of the ‘great man’. What these might specifically be is not explained in detail (for the ‘great man’ creates his own morality) these would be morals which are in some sense ‘life-affirming’.

    Under Nietzsche’s interpretation, moral values are symptoms or signs of a deeper physiological condition, psychological state, or attitude toward life. Nietzsche uses various terms to describe the antithesis between two radically opposed attitudes toward life exhibited by moral values in general. ‘Moral’ values are those of denial, sickness, metaphysics, of the reactionary and the plebiscite. The kind of life that Nietzsche thinks is not like this. Instead, a noble life is affirmative, creative, healthy, egoistic and brimming over with vitality. Such a person, for Nietzsche, sees that moral philosophy belongs to slave morality.

    So, for Nietzsche, the response to the skeptical question of ‘why should I be moral?’ becomes ‘what kind of life puts value on morality?’. Nietzsche thought that attempts to find a universal, rational morality were simply expressions of the denial of life and the denial of the ‘will to power’.

    Nietzsche on Master and Slave Morality

    Master–slave morality–slave_morality

  • Nietzsche on Master and Slave Morality

  • Nietzsche on the Origin of Good and Evil, Bad Conscience, and Ressentiment

  • Ethics: Friedrich Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals

  • in slave morality fear is mother of morals, Nietzschehas put good summary of slave religion like Christianity by saying. Christianity is metaphysics of hangman. Lota ji i have question for you what is your idea of morality, please explain you learn from moarlity in plain urdu. Is morality of one culture differs from other

  • Nietzsche: Master & Slave Morality

    Nietzsche: Master & Slave Morality

    Master morality

    Nietzsche defined master morality as the morality of the

    strong-willed. What is good is what is helpful; what is bad is what

    is harmful. Morality as such is sentiment. In the prehistoric state,

    "the value or non-value of an action was derived from its

    consequences" but ultimately, "There are no moral phenomena at

    all, only moral interpretations of phenomena." For these strongwilled

    men, the 'good' is the noble, strong and powerful, while the

    'bad' is the weak, cowardly, timid and petty. The essence of master

    morality is nobility. Morality is designed to protect that which the

    strong-willed man values, and for slave and master, "Fear is the

    mother of morality." Other qualities that are often valued in master

    moralities are open-mindedness, courage, truthfulness, trust and

    an accurate sense of self-worth. Master morality begins in the

    'noble man' with a spontaneous idea of the good, then the idea of

    bad develops as what is not good. "The noble type of man

    experiences itself as determining values; it does not need approval;

    it judges, 'what is harmful to me is harmful in itself'; it knows itself

    to be that which first accords honour to things; it is value

    creating." Ultimately, "There are no moral phenomena at all, only

    moral interpretations of phenomena." In this sense, the master

    morality is the full recognition that oneself is the measure of all

    things. Insomuch as something is helpful to the strong-willed man

    it is like what he values in himself; therefore, the strong-willed man

    values such things as 'good'. Masters are creators of morality;

    slaves responds to master-morality with their slave-morality.

    Slave morality

    Unlike master morality which is sentiment, slave morality is

    literally re-sentiment (resentment) – revaluing that which the

    master values. This strays from the valuation of actions based on

    consequences to the valuation of actions based on "intention". As

    master morality originates in the strong, slave morality originates

    in the weak. Slave morality is a reaction to oppression, it creates

    villains of its oppressors. Slave morality is the inverse of master

    morality. As such, it is characterized by pessimism and skepticism.

    Slave morality is created in opposition to what master morality

    values as 'good'. Slave morality does not aim at exerting one's will

    by strength but by careful subversion. It does not seek to transcend

    the masters, but to make them slaves as well. The essence of slave

    morality is utility: the good is what is most useful for the whole

    community, not the strong. Nietzsche saw this as a contradiction,

    “and [sic] how could there exist a common good”. The expression is

    a self-contradiction: what can be common has ever been but little

    value. In the end it must be as it has always been: great things are

    for the great, abysses for the profound, shudders and delicacies, for

    the refined, and, in sum, all rare things for the rare." Since the

    powerful are few in number compared to the masses of the weak,

    the weak gain power by corrupting the strong into believing that

    the causes of slavery (viz., the will to power) are 'evil', and the

    qualities they originally could not choose because of their

    weakness. By saying humility is voluntary, slave morality avoids

    admitting that their humility was in the beginning force upon them

    by a master. Biblical principles of turning the other cheek,

    humility, charity, and pity are the result of universalizing the plight

    of the slave onto all mankind, and thus enslaving the masters as

    well. "The democratic movement inherits the Christian." The

    political manifestation of slave morality because of its obsession

    with freedom and equality.

    Master-slave morality is a central theme of Friedrich

    Nietzsche's works, in particular the first essay of On the Genealogy

    of Morality. Nietzsche argued that there were two fundamental types of morality: 'Master Morality' and 'Slave Morality'.

    Master Morality weighs actions on a scale of good or bad consequences

    unlike slave morality which weighs actions on a scale of good or evil

    intentions. What Nietzsche meant by 'morality' deviates from

    common understanding of this term. For Nietzsche, a particular

    morality is the inseparable from the formation of a particular

    culture. This means that its language, codes and practises,

    narratives, and institutions are informed by the struggle between

    these two types of moral valuation. For Nietzsche, master-slave

    morality provides the basis of all exegesis of Western thought. With

    the Death of God morality became historical: it was created by

    mankind, not by a transcendent deity. The strong-willed man

    created morality by valuation.

    It is then these two character-types–the master and the slave–

    that we find in the world, amidst the contest of wills, the struggle of

    forces, the exercise of power. The two personality-types cannot be

    anymore different. In contrast to the master, who “cannot separate

    action from happiness,” happiness for the slave is “obsessed with

    poisonous, malevolent feelings.” Correlatively, “when the powerful

    person hates, he may discharge his hatred through direct action,

    and get it out of his system. The weak, however, cannot do this.

    They must contain their hatred, which acts as a psychological

    toxin, poisoning the spirit.” This leads the slave to resentment.

    Despite (and reinforced by) forming his system of morality,

    the slave (still) feels resentment: “he resents the master’s strength

    as well as his own relative impotency.” According to Nietzsche’s

    estimation, the slave must recognize that he is bad, “yet he is not

    able to accept the idea that he is to be treated any differently from

    anyone else, however high or low; or that he is to be treated as a

    means to the master’s purposes or pleasures. As a human being,

    he feels that he has been treated with insufficient dignity, or with

    none.” The slave thus (subtly, secretively, after bottling up the

    hatred deep inside)–using religion, their most common tool–takes

    revenge on the master. Nietzsche claims that this has historically

    consisted “in getting the master to accept the value table of the

    slave himself, and to evaluate himself from the slave’s perspective”

    (hence the world’s dominant religions). Thus, the slaves manage to

    transform the master into the ascetic.

    Existentialism is a philosophical movement which posits that

    individual human beings create the meaning and essence of their

    lives. It emerged as a movement in twentieth-century literature and

    philosophy, though it had forerunners in earlier centuries.

    Existentialism generally postulates that the absence of a

    transcendent force (such as God) means that the individual is

    entirely free, and, therefore, ultimately responsible. (Nevertheless,

    Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky were Christians.) It is up to humans to

    create an ethos of personal responsibility outside of any branded

    belief system. That personal articulation of being is the only way to

    rise above humanity's absurd condition (suffering and death, and

    the finality of the individual).

    Existentialism is a reaction against traditional philosophies,

    such as rationalism and empiricism, seeking to discover an

    ultimate order in metaphysical principles or in the structure of the

    observed world, and therefore universal meaning. As a

    philosophical movement, existentialism's origins are heavily

    accredited to the nineteenth-century philosophers Kierkegaard and

    Nietzsche, and existentialism was prevalent in Continental

    philosophy. Literary writers such as Dostoevsky also contributed to

    the movement.

    In the 1940s and 1950s, French existentialists such as Jean-

    Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and Simone de Beauvoir, wrote

    scholarly and fictional works that popularized existential themes

    such as "dread, boredom, alienation, the absurd, freedom,

    commitment, and nothingness". Walter Kaufmann described

    Existentialism as, "The refusal to belong to any school of thought,

    the repudiation of the adequacy of any body of beliefs whatever,

    and especially of systems, and a marked dissatisfaction with

    traditional philosophy as superficial, academic, and remote from


    Nietzsche's works were published too early to be considered a

    part of the 20th century existentialist movement. They were

    philosophers whose works and influences are not limited to

    existentialism. They have been appropriated and seen as

    precursors to many other intellectual movements, including

    postmodernism, nihilism, and various strands of psychology. Thus,

    it is unknown whether they would have supported the

    existentialism of the 20th century or accepted tenets of Jean-Paul

    Sartre's version of it. Nevertheless, their works are precursors to

    many later developments in existentialist thought. Nietzsche wrote

    that human nature and human identity vary depending on what

    values and beliefs humans hold. It is a fundamental existential

    belief that human beings are alone in the world. This aloneness

    leads to feelings of meaninglessness which can be overcome only by

    creating one's own values and meanings. We have the power to

    create because we have the freedom to choose. In making our own

    choices we assume full responsibility for the results and blame no

    one but ourselves if the result is less than what was desired. The

    psychotherapist helps his or her patients/clients along this path: to

    discover why the patient/client is overburdened by the anxieties of

    aloneness and meaninglessness, to find new and better ways to

    manage these anxieties, to make new and healthy choices, and to

    emerge from therapy as a free and sound human being.

    Nietzsche's aesthetic usage of the concepts, which was later

    developed philosophically, began with his book The Birth of

    Tragedy. In this work, he stated that a fusion of Dionysian and

    Apollonian "Kunsttriebe" (artistic impulses) is dramatic art's

    (tragedy's) main prerequisite and that this has essentially not been

    achieved since ancient Greek tragedy. Nietzsche emphasizes that

    the works of Aeschylus, above all, and also Sophocles represent the

    summit of artistic creation, the true realization of tragedy; it is with

    Euripides, he states, that tragedy begins its "Untergang" (literally

    "going under," meaning decline, deterioration, downfall, death).

    Nietzsche objects to Euripides' utilization of Socratic rationalism in

    his tragedies, claiming that the infusion of ethics and reason in

    tragedy robs it of its foundation, namely the fragile balance of the

    Dionysian and Apollonian.

    Apollonian: the dream state, principium individuationis

    (principle of individuation), plastic (visual) arts, beauty, clarity,

    stint to formed boundaries, individuality, celebration of

    appearance/illusion, human beings as artists (or media of art's

    manifestation), self-control, perfection, exhaustion of possibilities,


    Dionysian: intoxication, celebration of nature, instinctual,

    intuitive, pertaining to the sensation of pleasure or pain,

    individuality dissolved and hence destroyed, wholeness of

    existence, orgiastic passion, dissolution of all boundaries, excess,

    human being(s) as the work and glorification of art, destruction.

    This struggle between master and slave moralities recurs

    historically. According to Nietzsche, ancient Greek and Roman

    societies were grounded in master morality. The Homeric hero is

    the strong-willed man, and the classical roots of the Iliad and

    Odyssey exemplified Nietzsche's master morality. He calls the

    heroes "men of a noble culture", giving a substantive example of

    master morality. Historically, master morality was defeated as the

    slave morality of Christianity spread throughout the Roman


    According to Nietzsche, the essential struggle between

    cultures has always been between the Roman (master, strong) and

    the Judean (slave, weak). He condemns the triumph of slave

    morality in the West, saying that the democratic movement is the

    "collective degeneration of man". Nietzsche claimed that the

    nascent democratic movement of his time was essentially Jewish,

    slavish, and weak. Weakness conquered strength, slave conquered

    master, re-sentiment conquered sentiment. This resentment

    Nietzsche calls "priestly vindictiveness", which is the jealousy of the

    weak seeking to enslave the strong with itself. Such movements

    were, to Nietzsche, inspired by "the most intelligent revenge" of the

    weak. Nietzsche saw democracy and Christianity as the same

    emasculating impulse which sought to make all equal--to make all


  • فیر صاحب

    میری محدود سوچ میں مورالیٹی انسان کے فطری جذبے ، خوائشیں ، خوف، حسرتیں اور وہ کیا چیزیں سچ ، جھوٹ ، اچھی اور بری سمجھھتا ہے (سوچے سمجھے بغیر ) اور ایک طرح سے یہ سمج نچر سے اتی ہے کہ اولوشن کے عمل میں کیا ضروری ہے اکھٹے مل کر رہنے کے لئے کیا اچھا اور صحیح ہے . ماں باپ کا جینٹک کوڈ کن چیزوں کو کام کی سمج کر پاس کرتا ہے اور زندگی کس جگہ اورکیسی ملتی ہے . یہ سیم عمل انسان پر بھی اثر ڈالتا ہے اور معاشرے پر بھی

  • Neitzsche’s theories of “master and slave”, “noble type of man is beyeond good and evil”, “Will to power” et al, cannot be understood fully unless present scenario of the world is debated at length.

    When Neitzsche presented his thesis, it was almost perfect for philosophers at that point in time. Not any more. Because anthropo-psychology of modern period has created dents and faults in Neitzsche’s thesis. To simplify the matter, only those groups, societies can afford morality that have not only will to power but have brutally used their “will” in the name of “noble morality” (beyond good and evil).

    Slavery is almost abolished throughout the world. But salve and master abstract-cum-real relation does exist today. On this point Neitzsche’s theory is close to reality. All the theories and topics such as being discussed here are fluid and never static.

  • I do not know about other slavery but this I know crystal clear.

    We did not get Independence from Slavery of Goldsmith Papa (British Raj) in 20th Century to become Slave of Goldsmith children in 21st Century under Pappu Burger revolution.

  • ^^^

    And what about Mughle Azam family slavery?

  • Interesting discussion - in nutshell morality is the trait of weak. The last resort to win the argument after force or logic options run out. Powerful uses morality only to cover his brute force.

  • If you trace the written historical evidence that once the Goddess rule on the planet was slowly eradicated, the rise of the Man rule eventually adopted the two party system, one Aqa, the other Ghullam in Arabic terminology, the word Aqa is actually of Babylonian, Sumerian language Akkadian which means "who farms the land" and Ghullam originates in the Goddess culture, a genetically bred male for sex with the female management and also for fighting. This category of genetically bred and raised for sexual and violent functions became the militant wing of society, I am using extremely simplified and overly stupid manner to describe human histories travel over 50 thousand years, but I shall identify these points in current folk culture .......

    The powerful mind set and the weak mind set both create their own "environments" and both use a binary method to "classify" their respective "survival skills" as "good" and the opposite of this is the "bad".........simple enough and Muchal genius of the German origin Nietzsche(pronounced in German like the Urdu word for "down" "neechay"), this muchal khan type for some how and I suspect that he had access to ancient Persian, Chinese and vedic literature....cause the Babylonians and Iranians overlap and Iranians are also very very old but less published than other cultures due to political day they will be valued ....

    anyways.....this story is old both groups the master race , upper class and then the lower class, gave space to another class, the "middle class"....slaves who are not really slaves and masters who are not really masters but do, look, and mentally think they are, but act and fear like the slaves......!

    The Aqa of Babylonian society is called "Chahar Tarafi" in ancient persian, which gets distorted due to mouth-shape of the Indus Valley society into "Cho-tarafi" with another thousand years and the "T" in the "tarafi" is thick like "The" sound of "D"...."Cho-Darafi"...eventually Chodari and now a days "chowi sab" the D is getting silent in speech but exists in writing or the hindi origin urdu ....

    The working of the minds is the same in both groups, meaning that both have a feeling oriented frame work, both have the same measure called "good" and "bad" but fit these psychological boxes with "their" feelings and their "survival logic" group feels like having the ability to appear strong and free and group thinking is "good" while the other calls "good" to "non violent, lay down, turn one the cheek, maaf kardo, rehm karo, thoray par guzara karo" as good........

    for example, when u sit on a dinner table in current day middle class family and do not finish you food in the plate, some mofo aunty or uncle will make sure to remind you that, beta plate mein khana poora khao, dekho africa mein loog bhookay mar rahay hain.....but if you sit on the spread of an Arab who now a days is the role model for other Muslims will throw tons of their food away un eaten without any consideration cause in his mind "every one is getting their share via fate" ....both are doing "good"

    Chowdry, Aqa, Master and the Kami, Kameen, nookar, chakar, chuukar, and then the British system of pay scales the modern caste system all are based on the original binary format of Master and Slave, and to hint at the fact that Romans were slaves and slave sex soldiers too which then were molested by the dhobi and kanjri mafia of Jewish tribes who joined the Buddhist movement in Jerusalem started by Seydna Hazrat Essa a.s after returning from Tibet. (check research on missing years of Jesus) ...

    and now the same is playing out in America, and America the "slave" origin rules and the old master race shoots them dead on sight in the south when the white females sleeps with the slaves...and in Pakistan the slaves of the Master race of 26 money families , the lohar's now rule with the help of military slaves.......of the British Raj! (army books are British)

    I will return with more historical points, I am listening to Rauf Klasra in the background while typing this and my brain is getting distracted to the fake politics ....:)



    Nietzsche objects to herd morality because it values what does not have value. It is in the interests of lower, not higher men. If each person’s values help establish favourable conditions for themselves, then the triumph of herd morality will lead to the continuation of herd-like people. It is therefore not something for the human race as a whole to live by.

    Herd morality is a development of the original slave morality which inherits most of its content, including a reinterpretation of various traits: impotence becomes goodness of heart, craven fear becomes humility, submission becomes ‘obedience’, cowardice and being forced to wait become patience, the inability to take revenge becomes forgiveness, the desire for revenge becomes a desire for justice, a hatred of one’s enemy becomes a hatred of injustice (Genealogy of Morals I §14). Happiness is opposed to suffering; pity v. indifference to suffering; peacefulness v. danger; altruism v. self-love; equality v.

    inequality; communal utility v. endangering such utility; ridding oneself of instincts v. enjoyment of instinctual satisfaction; well-being of the soul v. well-being of the body.

    This morality values what has no intrinsic value, and very often endangers what is of much greater value, viz. human greatness. Greatness requires suffering, danger, self-love,

    inequality, it goes against what is in the interests of people in general and is an expression of instinctual energy. ‘Well-being’ in herd morality limits human beings, promoting people who are modest, submissive and conforming. And so it opposes the development of higher people, it slanders their will to power and labels them evil. Belief in its values limits people who could become higher people, leading them to self-doubt and selfloathing(§269).

    Nietzsche calls this morality both clever (or shrewd) and stupid (§198). It contains and controls powerful instinctual emotions and drives. This is shrewd because these are dangerous to a herd person, who does not have a strong enough will to control their own emotions or stand up to others’. But it is stupid, because it is based on misunderstanding and fear and opposes the development of higher people. The deep fear of other people also undermines herd morality’s own values. Fear means then there can be no genuine neighbourly love (§201). We do not and cannot practice altruism, but our moral values

    require us to believe in it. As herd morality as developed, it seems to have lost that element that belonged to the

    ascetic ideal. It becomes a form of utilitarianism, aimed at happiness in this world, rather than redemption in the next. But with the loss of the ascetic ideal, there is nothing to inspire people to try to become better, greater, by overcoming their weaknesses or finding a creative, powerful responses to their ressentiment. Nietzsche praises

    Christianity for the greatness in art and architecture, for the depths of the soul, it produced. Without the ascetic ideal, we lose this, and morality is no longer a form of selfovercoming, and people become ‘smaller’, less great.

    Above all, herd morality has led to the degeneration of the human race (§62). We are not a species of animal that has fully developed into what it can be, because we keep alive ‘a surplus of deformed, sick, degenerating, frail’ people, which ‘ought to perish’.

    Christianity has bred a mediocre, sickly, good-natured animal.


    By ‘modern ideas’, Nietzsche means what we might call ‘secular humanism’. ‘Modern ideas’ include the values of democracy and equality, a work ethic, a morality that opposes suffering, and beliefs in science and positivism (the view that philosophy should limit itself to what is ‘given’ in experience and the study of scientific methodology). Nietzsche criticises these values and argues that they originate in religion, even though most people

    of ‘modern ideas’ claim to be ‘atheists’. Democracy is founded on the value of equality – that all people are equal and so should have an equal say in how society is run. Yet the idea of equality should be more contentious than it has become. Samuel Johnson said ‘So far is it from being true that men are naturally equal, that no two people can be half an hour together, but one shall acquire an evident superiority over the other’ (Boswell, Life of Johnson, Vol. 1, p. 318). If inequality is so easily established, what does our belief in equality rest upon?

    Equality and democracy are instincts of ‘the herd’ (§202), values that favour the unexceptional and mediocre. They do not recognise and respect the exceptional. In this,

    democrats, anarchists and socialists, even if they are atheists, uphold the values of Christianity. They all want a ‘free’ society of equals, i.e. a society of an autonomous herd, and believe the community will save humanity. The elimination of suffering is the foundation of their morality, which they think of as objective. They cannot recognise its perspectival nature.

    When Nietzsche condemns pity, he is not suggesting we should be heartless. He isn’t talking about refusing to give food to someone hungry. He opposes pity as the basis of

    morality, because pity seeks to eliminate suffering, which is the origin of greatness. First,pity wrongly preserves the weak and prevents people from becoming stronger through

    suffering. Second, pity demeans both the person who is shown pity and the person who shows it. The pitied person is shown to lack power, and their self-respect will be

    undermined; so pity brings them more suffering. The person who shows pity suffers for the suffering of the other person – again, doubling suffering. And they show a lack of

    self-respect, as pity asserts a false equality, that ‘you and I’ suffer together. Third, human beings inevitably suffer, so pity’s attempt to alleviate all suffering sets itself against life.

    Finally, pity sees individuals as valuable, but, Nietzsche has argued, the goal of humankind lies in its highest specimens. Nietzsche’s pity does not focus on ‘social

    welfare’, but on how the human race as a whole has been reduced, prevented from greatness, by values of a morality of pity (§225).


    Another ‘modern idea’ is the work ethic (work is morally good and makes us better people). This destroys time for self-examination and reflection. Because a religious life

    requires this time (§58) (as does the new philosophy), the work ethic contributes to atheism. Believers in ‘modern ideas’ are liable to feel superior to religion, but they

    completely fail to understand it. They don’t understand whether they should treat it as work or leisure, their minds have become so narrow in its categories of understanding.

    But they seek to be ‘tolerant’, while actually avoiding the pain of real tolerance. They fail to show the proper reverence for what is of real value, feeling as if they have the right to investigate, touch, everything; they lack shame, (§263). Nietzsche, even as he attacks religion, has enormous regard for it, so he has no respect for people who reject religion thoughtlessly.

    Thinkers who ‘freed’ themselves from the dogmas of religion and advocated a secular humanism thought of themselves as ‘free spirits’ – turning over past conceptions of right

    and wrong, advocating a new basis for society. But Nietzsche argues that they are merely continuing the work of religion under a new guise (§44), supporting the further

    domination of ‘herd’ values and undermining the conditions necessary for human greatness. By contrast, the new philosophers see that humankind is degenerating; they

    see ‘the fate that lies hidden in the stupid innocence and blissful confidence of “modern

    ideas”’ (§203).


    Nietzsche does not criticise science, but scientism, a faith in science as the ultimate source of knowledge and solutions to the problems of life and suffering. Science does not genuinely explain the world (§14), but only describes it. This is accepted and applauded by positivism as all we can do. We are convinced by science because it agrees with the popular idea that we can only clearly know about what we can see and touch.

    But while Nietzsche agrees, he argues that we must treat the evidence of our senses cautiously, as all our experience is shot through with our values. Believers in science and positivism fail to recognise this; as with their morality, they think that scientific knowledge is unconditional and objective. For example, they do not recognise the connection between the scientific idea of ‘laws of nature’ and their commitment to the

    values of democracy and equality (§22).

    And so science cannot replace philosophy for two reasons. First, it is philosophy that establishes the truth of perspectivism; the perspective of science is a foreground

    perspective that fails to acknowledge itself as a perspective. Second, science incorporates values but cannot create or dictate values. This is the job of the new philosophers.

    Science, then, is a tool in the service of new philosophers. Believers in ‘modern ideas’

    elevate science above its proper position.

  • Nietzsche on master and slave morality

    Beyond Good and Evil §260 describes the fundamental division between the morality the moralities of the ‘herd’ and of ‘higher’ people. While the contrast is stark, Nietzsche says,at the outset,

    I would add at once that in all higher and complex cultures, there are also apparent

    attempts to mediate between the two moralities, and even more often a confusion of the two and a mutual misunderstanding… - even in the same person.

    So his descriptions are ‘idealized’, while identifying the diverse origins of our actual morality.


    In a master or noble morality, ‘good’ picks out exalted and proud states of mind, and it therefore refers to people, not actions, in the first instance. ‘Bad’ means ‘lowly’,

    ‘despicable’, and refers to people who are petty, cowardly, or concerned with what is useful, rather than what is grand or great. (Notice that none of this depends on the idea

    of free will.) Good-bad identifies a hierarchy of people, the noble masters or aristocracy and the common people. The noble person only recognises moral duties towards their

    equals; how they treat people below them is not a matter of morality at all. The good, noble person has a sense of ‘fullness’ – of power, wealth, ability, and so on. From the‘overflowing’ of these qualities, not from pity, they will help other people, including people below them.

    Noble people experience themselves as the origin of value, deciding what is good or not.‘Good’ originates in self-affirmation, a celebration of one’s own greatness and power.

    They don’t need others to say they are good. They revere themselves, and have a devotion for whatever is great. But this is not self-indulgence: any signs of weakness are

    despised, and harshness and severity are respected.

    A noble morality is a morality of gratitude and vengeance. Friendship involves mutual respect and a rejection of over-familiarity, while enemies are necessary, in order to vent

    feelings of envy, aggression and arrogance.

    All these qualities mean that the good person rightly evokes fear in those who are not their equal and a respectful distance in those who are.


    Slave morality begins with the rejection of master morality. It does not and cannot stand on its own. The traits of the noble person are evil (not ‘bad’), and what is good is their absence. Its focus is the relief of suffering – whatever is useful or opposes oppression is

    morally good. So pity, altruism, and a lack of interest in oneself are good. In opposing the noble morality, it also encourages humility and patience. It questions the apparent

    happiness of the noble person, rejects hierarchy, and argues that morality is the same for all.

    But it is pessimistic about the human condition, doubting the goodness of this life, and so it sees people as weak and pitiful. So it must look to the future and believe in

    ‘progress’, in things getting better. It lacks respect for the past, for traditions and ancestors. Finally, when slave morality dominates, there is a tendency for ‘good’ people

    and ‘good’ actions to be thought of as ‘stupid’ or simple-minded.

    The ‘slave revolt’

    If societies in Europe began with a noble morality, at some point, slave morality became dominant. How and when did this revolution in values occur? Nietzsche’s third historical account, this one from the perspective of the slaves, identifies the Jewish prophets as the

    origin (§195). It was they, he says, who ‘fused “rich”, “godless”, “evil”, “violent”,

    “sensuous” into one entity, and were the first to mint the word ‘world’ as a curse word’. Worldly success (what was ‘good’) indicates moral failure (is now ‘evil’). But the Jewish prophets were only the beginning – it is Christianity which carried forward the revolt.

    (While it is important that – at its origins – real class differences between these groups and the Greek and Roman aristocracy existed, as usual, Nietzsche is more interested in the psychological story. There is nothing specifically Jewish about a slave morality, and Nietzsche is uninterested in the differences between Jew, Christian and slave in this account.)

    What drove this ‘revaluation of values’? In §46, Nietzsche says the slave’s ‘manifold hidden suffering rages against that noble sensibility which seems to deny suffering’. The

    Roman rulers seemed, and valued being, free-spirited (reinterpret: wicked), self-confident

    (decadent), care-free (lazy), tolerant (unruly). They viewed slaves with contempt, pity, and disdain, causing hatred that could not be expressed directly. And so it turned into what Nietzsche calls elsewhere ressentiment, a kind of resentment. In someone with a slave mentality, the feeling grows as no action is taken. Instead of a political revolt, revenge took the form of a moral revolt. The pent-up feelings of resentment were expressed through blame, an idea that has little place in a noble morality.

    A slave morality therefore centres on the question of blame, and not just for actions, but also for being who and how one is. This requires the idea that one could act or be

    different, and makes guilt (for not being or doing ‘better’) the heart of morality. Guilt causes suffering, but the slave has known only suffering, tyranny, being commanded – so morality becomes unconditional commands, e.g. of a God (§§194-5).

    Ressentiment is a reactive rather than creative attitude towards the world, focusing on others, rather than oneself. It tends to produce self-deception – the slave morality must

    cover its origins carefully, not least because it disapproves of the very motives, of envy, hatred and ressentiment, that drive it. The sacrifice that morality requires is seen not as tyranny or revenge, but as an act of love. In contrast to the simplicity of the original

    nobles (p. xxx), it was through ressentiment, Nietzsche says, that ‘the human soul became deep’ (The Genealogy of Morals, §6), and certain kinds of cultural expression

    became possible, e.g. in response to the deep guilt people felt about themselves.

  • Nietzsche’s ‘histories’ of morality

    One of Nietzsche’s primary concerns in providing a history of morality is to understand how certain values (pity, selflessness, etc.), which he associates with ‘herd’ morality, became values. ‘Morality’, both its scope and its psychology (e.g. conscience, guilt), is a product of historical development. We can’t understand a moral value or psychological state unless we use history, because that value or state frequently often inherits several

    different meanings from different times in the past. Through understanding its history,

    we can distinguish the different meanings and different feelings, and see how and why they changed over time. In turn, this helps us to understand that there are alternatives to these values and states.

    Nietzsche tells several stories about how pity, self-denial and so on became values, how ‘herd morality’ came to dominate. One is from the perspective of the ‘masters’; one is from the perspective of the ‘slaves’; a third explanation draws on the role of evolution in

    forming human nature. The three stories should be seen as complementary, together building up the whole picture. A fourth history identifies various stages in the development of morality.


    In §§257, 258, and 262, Nietzsche gives us one such history. Every ‘higher’ or noble culture began with barbarians, ‘predatory’ humans who conquered either the ‘more wellbehaved, peaceable’ ones or ‘crumbling cultures’. They establish an ‘aristocratic’ class,

    based in ideas of a natural hierarchy between people, who dominated by their stronger will to power. This class is the origin of ideas of ‘nobility’. The aristocratic class – Nietzsche has in mind the aristocratic societies of ancient Rome and Greece – faced challenging conditions, wars with other societies, the threat of revolt by those oppressed. These conditions made for strong, unified people with a harsh and intolerant set of values. Such a class has no qualms about using ‘lower’ human beings for its own ends; this is itself understood as ‘justice’ (§265) and ‘natural’. The whole of society is understood to exist for their sake, for the sake of what is great and noble.

    Over time, conditions change, and life for the aristocrats becomes easy. So the attachment to discipline, both self-discipline and severe punishment, fades away as it is

    no longer necessary. Individuals emerge as individuals, varied from one another, rather than expressions of class values. They assert their individual wills and values, and both good and bad develop new forms. The old unity of values, of ‘instincts’, is broken, leading to a sense of decay and misunderstanding. This new danger is located not in enemies or slaves, but among neighbours and even in oneself. The great, strong and harsh will has dissipated and become corrupt. The new danger is met with a new

    morality, one based on fear of the individual. What remains, and what makes sense, is the ‘mediocre’, a morality that encourages people to be the same.

    This is one way, Nietzsche says, that values associated with greatness were replaced by values that favoured the majority, the ‘herd’. We can identify the story of ‘decline’ with several points in history: first, changes in ancient Greek societies, between 800BC (the

    time of Homer’s tales of war) and 250BC, after which Greek empire was slowly eclipsed by the rise of the Roman empire; second, changes in the Roman empire between 400BC

    and 300AD (when the emperor Constantine converted to Christianity); and once more, in changes in European societies between the Middle Ages and the modern period (e.g.

    Nietzsche refers to the French Revolution).

    What is noble today is not identical to its origins in these aristocratic societies. The very earliest nobles, descendents of the barbarians, are fairly boring in their approach to life and their indifference to suffering. By contrast, Nietzsche repeatedly praises the creativity

    that the constraints of ‘herd’ morality has produced (§§46, 59, 188). It is not until the will to power turns back against the self, seeks to exercise power over its own instincts, as in the ascetic ideal, that things get interesting. Second, the aristocrats’ greatness was that of

    a united class, and the independence of free spirits and new philosophers was not recognisable then. However, there are continuities between noble aristocracies of the past and ‘nobility’ today.


    The ascetic ideal is paradoxical for Nietzsche. It seems to oppose life and the will itself; and yet all values are an expression of the will to power. How could it have been adopted at all, and how could it have become so widespread? Answering these questions will complete the natural history of morals.

    The spread of the ascetic ideal (in the West) originates in the slave revolt (see the handout on ‘Master and slave morality’, which Nietzsche says began with the Jewish

    prophets and continued with Christianity. It was not, then, slaves but priests (and saints) who first held the ascetic ideal. This is only suggested in Beyond Good and Evil, but

    developed at length in On the Genealogy of Morals, Essay III.

    The priests do not have the direct, expressive will to power as the aristocrats. They resent the power of the aristocrats and the respect they have gained, but they cannot express this directly. So they teach that aristocratic values are evil and decadent, and praise a life

    of poverty and self-denial, the opposite of the aristocratic ideal. They develop the idea of God to support this revaluation. God will punish evil-doers (the aristocrats) and reward the good (the slaves). They create a standard by which the nobles are inferior to themselves and the common people. So they use the ascetic ideal to gain power as teachers, and therefore leaders, of the people. Nietzsche connects this account to Christianity’s gaining power in the Roman empire, although the ‘priest’ type exists everywhere, he says.

    But why should people listen to the priests accept this revaluation? What is the appeal?

    The aristocrats: the ancient aristocrats were amazed by the phenomenon of the saint, respecting the self-discipline involved in self-denial: ‘in it they recognized anew and were able to honour their own strength’ (§51). They made the mistake of thinking that the ‘monstrous denial’ required by the ascetic ideal could not be for nothing, and so become susceptible to the saint’s values.

    The common people: the praised life of poverty and self-denial is the common person’s life. They suffer physically, but also mentally, through the ressentiment they feel towards the aristocrats. But what is worst is the thought that their suffering is meaningless. The ascetic ideal gives meaning to their suffering, providing two outlets for their ressentiment: first, that the aristocrats can be blamed (an imaginary form of revenge), but second and more centrally, that they are themselves the cause of their suffering. The ascetic ideal condemns the body, our instincts, our sensuous desires; yet we are animals

    with these desires. Our suffering is our punishment for being what we are, for not successfully transcending the body and the world, for not living up to the ascetic ideal.

    This makes suffering meaningful, and therefore bearable. Furthermore, the idea of a transcendent world after this one provides hope. And so the common people adopt the

    ascetic ideal.

    Common people have only a weak to will to power that struggles to maintain itself in the face of so much suffering. The denial of the will to power, the denial of this bodily life in favour of a spiritual life in a transcendent world, is a way in which their will and their

    lives succeed in maintaining themselves. So the ascetic ideal is an expression of their will to power.


    In §199, Nietzsche writes that ‘for as long as there have been humans, there have also been… a great many followers in proportion to the small number of commanders…

    obedience has until now been bred and practised best and longest among humans’. He continues later, ‘the herd instinct of obedience is inherited best, and at the cost of the skill in commanding’. In evolution, what does not reproduce well does not survive in future generations. What enables a person to get on well with many other people will

    favour most individuals and their reproductive success – but these will be ‘herd’ instincts and values, because by definition, the majority are the ‘herd’. What is exceptional, what is great, is rare. So evolution opposes greatness and favours what is common. The kind of

    ‘commanders’ the herd favours are tame, modest, hard-working and public-spirited, commanders who actually serve the herd rather than commanding them. Nietzsche develops the point in §268: to communicate with and understand other

    people, we have to share experiences with them. What thoughts and feelings words immediately bring to mind reflects our values. So people of different types will have

    difficulty understanding each other. People who are commanders will be hard for other people, the ‘herd’, to understand. And so they rarely procreate. If we are to breed new philosophers, and new philosophers are to breed the human race to become greater, we

    will have to draw on ‘enormous counterforces’ since we are in conflict with the natural

    forces of evolution.

    However, the constraint placed on the will to power by ‘herd’ morality has been creative;

    it is ‘the means by which the European spirit was bred to be strong, ruthlessly curious,

    and beautifully nimble’ (§188). This tension drives free spirits to overcome the ascetic

    ideal and prepare the conditions for new philosophers.


    In §32, Nietzsche talks about the different stages that morality has gone through.

    Depending on how we divide up his account, we can get three or five stages.

    1. ‘Pre-moral’: In the first stage, of human pre-history, the value of an action depended

    entirely on its consequences. Motives were considered unimportant.

    2. Moral:

    a. In the next stage (or part-stage), morality begins as the origins of an action

    became important. In order to be a morally good person, one needed to ‘look


    b. But then a terrible mistake, still with us today: the ‘origin’ and value of an action

    was equated with the person’s intention, i.e. what the person consciously decided.

    3. ‘Extra-moral’:

    a. The next stage, in the near future, will identify the value of an action not by what

    the person intended, which is superficial and misleading, but by what was not

    intentional (e.g. an ‘unintended’ consequence or the manner in which the action

    is done), which we can relate to what brought about the action that was not part

    of the intention.

    b. Finally, we will move beyond good and evil and new philosophers create new


    Many remarks suggest that the master morality of the aristocrats accepted 2a, while the

    shift to 2b corresponds with the rise in slave morality, with the breakdown of the unity

    of the instincts and the resulting concern with the danger ‘in oneself’. With these

    changes, identifying the particular thought or motive becomes important, and the illusion

    that we can identify particular motives in this way as the causes of actions is encouraged.

  • @Qadir M Sahab

    To those human beings who are of any concern to me I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities — I wish that they should not remain unfamiliar with profound self-contempt, the torture of self-mistrust, the wretchedness of the vanquished: I have no pity for them, because I wish them the only thing that can prove today whether one is worth anything or not — that one endures.”

    — Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power

  • qadirm


    PM this user

    The Aqa of Babylonian society is called "Chahar Tarafi" in ancient persian, which gets distorted due to mouth-shape of the Indus Valley society into "Cho-tarafi" with another thousand years and the "T" in the "tarafi" is thick like "The" sound of "D"...."Cho-Darafi"...eventually Chodari and now a days "chowi sab" the D is getting silent in speech but exists in writing or the hindi origin urdu ....


    POSTED 8 HOURS AGO ON 27 JUN 2015 1:37 #

    ملّا جی

    بھدو اور تکا لگانے کے لیے اٹک کی سرحد تک رہا کریں . ایرانی اور رومن زبانوں اور ان کے الفاظ کے ماخذ کے ساتھ جتنا چاہے زنا بالجبر کیا کریں لیکن ہندوستانی زبانوں کو معاف کر دیا کریں

    چوہدری ہندوستانی نظام مال کا ایک منصب تھا . اس نظام مال کی بنیاد شیر شاہ سوری نے رکھی تھی . اس نظام کو بعد میں مکمل طور پر فارسی زبان میں لکھا گیا اور اس کے فارسی ماخذ والے عہدے بالکل صحیح تلفظ کے ساتھ لکھے گئے . محکمہ مال کے ریکارڈ میں چو طرفی یا چہار طرفی نام کا کوئی منصب نہیں ہے . ایک سے زیادہ گاؤں سے متعلق ایک منصب دار چوہدری ہوتا تھا . یہ منصب موروثی ہوتا تھا اور باپ کے مرنے کے بعد اس کے بڑے بیٹے کے سر پر پگ باندھ کر اس کی تعیناتی کے لیے شاہی فرمان کی درخواست کی جاتی تھی

    اس لفظ کا ماخذ کیا ہے اس کو جاننے کے لیے تاریخ پڑھنا یا چوہدری ہونا ضروری ہے .

    پس تحریر : کمیوں اور زمین داروں کے درمیان ایک بہت ہی مضبوط معاشرتی رشتہ ہوتا تھا . اس کا اک اظہار اس طرح ہوتا تھا کہ کمیوں کی اولاد کاشت کاروں کے بڑوں کو ماما کہہ کر مخاطب کرتی تھی . کمیوں کی بڑی عمر کی عورتوں کو کاشتکاروں کے بچے ہمیشہ پووا یا پھوپھی کہہ کر مخاطب کرتے تھے

  • بھدو اور تکا لگانے کے لیے اٹک کی سرحد تک رہا کریں . ایرانی اور رومن زبانوں اور ان کے الفاظ کے ماخذ کے ساتھ جتنا چاہے زنا بالجبر کیا کریں لیکن ہندوستانی زبانوں کو معاف کر دیا کریں

    زندہ دل صاحب

    ہندوستانی /سنسکرت / فارسی ساری زبانیں انڈو یوروپین زبانیں ہیں . مجھے امید ہے کہ ان کے اپس میں موجود رشتے سے آپ باخبر ہیں . جو رومن زبانیں انڈو یورپین فیملی کا حصہ ہیں وہ بھی ان زبانوں سے منسلک ہیں . انڈو یورپین زبانیں اس خطے میں کیسے آئیں ؟؟

    ہندوستان کوئی دنیا سے الگ جگہ نہیں ہے

  • چوہدری ہندوستانی نظام مال کا ایک منصب تھا . اس نظام مال کی بنیاد شیر شاہ سوری نے رکھی تھی . اس نظام کو بعد میں مکمل طور پر فارسی زبان میں لکھا گیا اور اس کے فارسی ماخذ والے عہدے بالکل صحیح تلفظ کے ساتھ لکھے گئے . محکمہ مال کے ریکارڈ میں چو طرفی یا چہار طرفی نام کا کوئی منصب نہیں ہے

    آپ کے بلیف کے مطابق شیر شاہ سوری نے جاگیر داری کے ایک نئے نظام بنیاد رکھ دی اور اس سے پہلے دنیا میں اس سے پہلے ایسا کوئی نظام نہیں تھا . یعنی پانچ سو سال پہلے جاگیر داری شوروح کی گئی ؟؟؟

    کیا آپ واقی یہی کہنا چا رہے ہیں یا مجھے سمجھنے میں کوئی غلطی پیش ا رہی ہے ؟؟

    ؟- زندہ دل صاحب کیا آپ اٹمولوجی کے آئیڈیا سے واقف ہیں ؟؟

    ایک لفظ کی ہسٹری ، اس کی اساس ، کہاں سے وہ شوروح ہوا ، لفظ نے کیا فورم لیں اور کیسے وقت کے ساتھ وہ فارم بدلیں

    آپ کے بین کے مطابق شیر شاہ سوری نے کیا بلکل نئے لفظ ایجاد کیے ؟؟

    ایک لفظ میں فارسی کا درست تلفظ ہونے کا کیا یہ مطلب ہے کہ وہ لفظ کسی دوسری جگہ سے ادھار نہیں لیا گیا یا نہیں لیا جا سکتا ؟؟

    اگر ایک لفظ کسی اور جگہ سے مستعار لیا گیا تو اس کی تاریخ لکھنے کی کسی کو کیا ضرورت تھی ؟

    یا ایک لفظ فارسی زبان میں کسی اور زبان سے آیا تو ایک بادشاہ کو کیا ضرورت تھی کہ وہ اس بات کی منادی کرتا کہ زبان اس طرح ڈیولپ ہوتی ہے ؟؟

    امید ہے کہ آپ اٹھ پہرا روزہ رکھ کر پوسٹیں نہیں کر رہے اور گھر میں آپ کو سحری مل رہی ہے

  • کمیوں اور زمین داروں کے درمیان ایک بہت ہی مضبوط معاشرتی رشتہ ہوتا تھا . اس کا اک اظہار اس طرح ہوتا تھا کہ کمیوں کی اولاد کاشت کاروں کے بڑوں کو ماما کہہ کر مخاطب کرتی تھی . کمیوں کی بڑی عمر کی عورتوں کو کاشتکاروں کے بچے ہمیشہ پووا یا پھوپھی کہہ کر مخاطب کرتے تھے

    زندہ دل صاحب

    یہ ماموں اور بوا /پھپپی /پھپپو وغیرہ کے القابات کے استعمال سے کیا چودھری اور کمی کی معاشرتی حثیت معاشرے میں ایک تھی یا ہے ؟ ایک حجام کو خلیفہ کہنے سے وہ حجام ہی رہتا ہے اور امیر ال مومنین نہیں بن جاتا . بوائی یا کٹائی کے وقت جب کمی اکھٹے ہو کر فصلیں بو یا کاٹ رہے ہوتے تھے / ہیں تو کیا زمیندار یا اس کے گھر کے افراد اس عمل میں کمیوں کا ساتھ دیتے تھے / ہیں ؟ معاشرے میں کمی کا ایک رول ہے اور زمین دار کا رول اس سے مختلف ہے . ماموں / پھوپی بن کر یہ رول کیا ایک ہو جاتے ہیں ؟؟